The problem of causality in Islamic thought : a viewpoint of Al-Ghazali / Khalid Ismail by Ismail, Khalid
i 
• X ' tr' j »--••'' • ••'• 
UNIVERSITI 
TEKNOLOGI 
MARA 
University Publication Centre (UPENA) 
Jurnal Intelek 
URDC UiTM Perlis 
Volume 4 N o . 1 January 2 0 0 6 I S S N 1675-9885 
Audit Firms Merger and Audit Market Concentration Hilwani Hariri 
Ayoib Che Ahmad 
Norshimah Abd. Rahman 
Fairuz Fauzee 
Konsep Kekurangan Relatif dalam Ekonomi Islam Basri Abd. Ghani 
Sayuti Abd. Ghani 
Merger and Timeliness of Audit Report Hilwani Hariri 
Norshimah Abdul Rahman 
Fairuz Fauzee 
Ayoib Che Ahmad 
The Importance of Organizational Citizenship Behaviour 
Among Hotel Employees 
Shaiful Annuar Khalid 
Hassan Ali 
Suitability Study of Using Thermoplastic Starch Coating 
Material for Harum Manis (MA 128) Mango in 
Post Harvest Management 
Yazid Mohd Esa 
Sharizal Hasan 
Mohd Lias Kamal 
The Problem of Causality in Islamic Thought: A Viewpoint of Khalid Ismail 
Al-Ghazali 
Two Phase Fuzzy Multicriteria Model to Evaluate Teaching Mahmod Othman 
Ku Ruhana Ku Muhamud 
Azuraliza Abu Bakar 
Keprihatinan yang Luntur Terhadap Warga Emas Surina Nayan 
The Problem of Causality in Islamic 
Thought: A Viewpoint of Al-Ghazali 
Khalid Ismail 
The problem of causality (al-Sababiyyah)is one of the most controversial 
issues in Islamic theology in particular and philosophy in general. It discusses 
cause and effect such as fire is the cause of burning, marriage is the cause of 
having children, medicine is the cause of health and so on. In this modest 
paper, the author shall attempt to explain and analyse two essential groups 
in the history of Islamic Thought namely the Muslim Theologians (al-
Mutakallimun) and Muslim Aristotelian Philosophers (al-Falasifah al-
Masya 'iyyun). The former have usually used the term al-Sabab whereas the 
latter employed the term al-Ilah in referring to the theory of causality. 
Introduction 
Before discussing this topic, the author would like to clarify the distinction 
between the term al-sabab and al-illah. Do both terms have similar meaning or 
not? In fact Ibn. Sina (1950) applied both terms al-sabab and al-illah in which 
one of each occupies each other. Sometimes he used the term asbab al-Maujudat 
and other times ilah al-Maujudat. But he commonly used the term al-Ilah 
rather than the term al-Sabab in his treatise entitled Risalah al-Hudud. In this 
case al-Ghazali (1957) also followed Ibn. Sina in using this term by preferring to 
use the term al-Ilah only. While for Ibn Rushd (1964), he considered the terms 
al-Ilah and al-Sabab synonyms and both terms can be applied to the four 
causes. (al-Asbab al-Arba 'ah) namely the material cause (a\-llah al-Maddiyyah), 
the efficient cause (al-llah al-Fa'illiyyah), the formal cause {al-llah al-Suriyyah) 
and the final cause (al-llah al-Ghaiyyah). In Abi al-Baqa's book, both terms are 
applied in the same meaning according to the philosophers which means certain 
things need for another thing in order to create something. On the other hand, 
according to man of linguistics al-Ilah is the thing which creates something 
else and al-Sabab as the thing which motivates the agent to act. Therefore, the 
philosophers have called the former as al-Ilah al-Fa 'iliyyah (the efficient cause) 
and the latter as al-Ilah al-Gha 'iyyah. (the final cause) (Azam, 1986) 
Referring to Ibn Miskawayh (Azam, 1986) al-Sabab is the motivated thing 
for action and because of it the agent acts. On the contrary, al-Ilah itself is the 
agent therefore, al-Sabab becomes more specific with the accidental things 
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whereas al-Ilah becomes more specific with the substantial things. So according 
to the Muslim Aristotelian philosophers, the term al-Sabab and al-llah have 
been used in their philosophy. Normally, the two terms are used synonymously 
by al-Farabi (The second teacher) and as a result for the philosophers Allah 
S.W.T. is called the First Cause {al-llah al-Ula or al-Sababul Awwal). Some 
dictionaries or encyclopedias use the term al-llah to denote the First Cause 
and the other indicate the Second Cause (De boer, 1965). Consequently, the 
theory of causality was basically started by Aristotle (The first teacher) but 
after that it belongs to the philosophy. Aristotle considered this theory as the 
first premises or a priori data. That is why it could not blame in evidence itself. 
Therefore, he treated it not only as the principle or natural problem or 
metaphysical but also regarded as logical law of intellect. In this respect, he 
always talked on causes (illal) from it passive (rest) side more than it active 
(motion) side. For him the first thing should be called the cause which is an 
element of beings and its laws. For this reason, he always used the terms like 
awail, mabadi, usul and ustuqsat, all these terms are similar in meaning from 
one aspect vis a vis the terms illal and asbab (Azam, 1986). Thus, Aristotle's 
theory on four causes were accepted among Muslims because of the term 
Allah S.W.T. as the Efficient Cause which was employed by Stoicism (al-
Ruwaqiyyah) and it became easy for the Muslim to accept it. In reality, this 
problem is not merely following of Greek's thought but this principle that 
everything must have a cause is adopted from the first premises which is 
accepted and practiced by human beings. Furthermore, it is necessary for the 
sake of intellectual principles (De Boer, 1965). However, the principle of causality 
cannot be denied as the important principle in affirming objective of reality of 
sensation. If we are to deny this principle and its law in this respect, we will not 
attain discovery or any theories of knowledge and its law and also there is no 
validity of inference with any argument in various fields of human knowledge 
whether philosophical or scientific. Even though for those who rejected this 
principle inevitably using this method to reject the same matter (self method). 
Therefore, they also indirectly used this method or principle for denying this 
method or this principle.(Azam, 1986) 
The Position of Muslim Theologians 
As far as the topic is concerned, the author shall discuss it in general about 
Jabarites', Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites'doctrines. But the last section the topic 
will discuss specifically on al-Ghazali's view on causality as representative of 
Ash'arites doctrine or theologian. In attaining the general picture or idea of this 
matter as representative as a whole the author shall start with the Jabarite's 
view. (al-Baghdadi, 1910) 
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Causality and the School of Jabariyyah 
As we have known one of their doctrines is Allah S.W.T. was the absolute 
cause, no action, no deed for everyone unless for good. They neither affirm an 
action nor a power to the man but on the contrary Allah S.W.T. who creates all 
acts of human like who creates all the unloving things. This view of course, 
denies the relationship between cause and effect. 
Causality and the School of Mu'tazilah 
As for the Mu'tazihtes view, man has a power and will to create his acts himself 
in real not metaphor. He creates some acts by way of mubasyarah (directly) and 
some by way of tawlid. The term tawlid implies the necessary occurrence of 
another act of the doer. For example, the movement of Zaid's finger necessitates 
the movement of his ring. As a result, whenever they claimed that the doctrine 
of free will then indirectly it is necessary that they agreed with the principle of 
causality. With regard to the purpose of universal creation they said that Allah 
S.W.T. did not create this world freely but it was created fully with laws and 
purposes. Thus it denotes that they have agreed the principle of causality on 
this universe. (al-Asha'ari, 1969) 
Causality and the School of Asha' Irah 
While in the Asha'rites doctrines, there is a distinction between creation and 
acquisition of an action. God according to the Asha'rites is the creator of 
human actions and man is the acquisition. Actions of human beings are created 
by God; the creatures are not capable of creating any action. There is no creator 
except God and the actions of man are therefore His creation. Man cannot 
create anything; he cannot initiate work. God alone can create because absolute 
creation is His prerogative. God creates in man the power and the ability to the 
perform an act. He also creates in him the power to make free choice between 
two alternatives; right and wrong. This free choice of man is not effective in 
producing the action. It is the habit or nature of God to create the action 
corresponding to the choice and power created by Him in man. (Shariff, 1960) 
Furthermore, the attitude of the Asha'rites towards the law of causality was 
skeptical (syakiyyah). They denied objective validity of causality in nature. No 
created thing can be the cause of anything. Things in nature do not possess 
any power which could produce any effect. Whatever power the creatures 
might possess must have been given by God who alone possesses all real 
power. Things of the world do not possess any permanent nature. Fire, for 
instance does not possess the nature of burning; it does not burn. God creates 
in a substance, a being burns when fire touches it. While a scholar like Shibli 
mentions that the Asha'rites rejected the idea of causality with a view to defend 
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the possibility of miracles on the manifestations of which according to them 
also, prophet hood defended. However, al-Asha'ri maintained that a cause 
must always have the same effect. (Shariff, 1960) 
Al-Ghazali's View on the Theory of Causality 
Now we are going to discuss in more detail on the theory of causality according 
to al-Ghazali as written in his magnum opus namely Tahafut al-Falasifah. (al-
Ghazali, 1957) In his book, he focuses attention on the relation between those 
observable things customarily regarded as causes and effects. He begins by 
denying any such necessity offering a strictly epistemological argument to 
support his denial. In doing so, he explicitly affirms the inanimate things have 
no causal action and the Asha'rites doctrine that causal action resides 
exclusively with God, whose acts are always voluntary. All happenings 
according to this doctrine are the creation of God either directly or through the 
mediation of His angels. Al-Ghazali argues that their connection is due to the 
prior decree of God who creates them side by side, no due to its being necessary 
in itself. Then he illustrates his denial of necessary causal connection between 
observable things with the example of the contact between fire and cotton. 
(Marmura, 1981) Again he asserts quiet explicity that it is possible for such a 
contact to take place without the cotton being burnt and that it is possible for 
the cotton to turn into burnt ashes without contact with fire. The first claims 
that the burning is caused by the fire alone, which is an agent by its very nature, 
not by choice. This claim he denies, 
"The one who enacts the burning by by creating blackness in the cotton, 
disintegration in its parts, and by making it tinder and ashes is God 
directly or through the mediations of his angels. As for fire, which 
inanimate it has no action" 
Al-Ghazali then gives his argument that observation does not prove that it 
is the fire which causes the burning of cotton which is in contact with it. 
Observations only show that the burning occurs at the juncture of contact; it 
does not show that the burning occurs through or by fire. In this respect, al-
Ghazali writes: (Marmura, 1981) 
"According to us the connection between what is usually believed to be 
a cause and what is believed to be an effect is not a necessary connection 
for us ( Tndana). But with any two things where one is not the other and 
where neither the affirmation or negation of the one entails the affirmations 
or negation of the other, the existence or non-existence of the one does 
not render either the existence or non-existence of the other necessary, 
for example the quenching of thirst and drinking, satiety and eating, 
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burning and contact with fire. For the connection of all these things is 
due to God's prior decree, who creates them side by side not due to its 
being necessary in itself" 
(al-Ghazali, 1957; trans, 1963) 
Al-Ghazali's Criticism on the Philosopher 
Now we turn to al-Ghazali's critical analysis of the philosopher's notion of 
causality. As a matter of fact, there were two cardinal aspects of it to be noted, 
particularly: 
a. The relation between cause and effect is a relation of necessity where there 
is the cause, there is the effect and vice versa. 
b. The relation between the cause and effect is the relation of one to one; the 
same cause, the same effect and vice versa. (Sheikh, 1962) 
Al-Ghazali strongly challenges both statements. With respect to the former 
he proclaims that there is no compelling necessity in the relation between cause 
and effect. Take for instance, fire and burning or drinking and quenching of 
thirst or eating and feeling of satiety; there is no necessity to be viewed here 
between the one and the other. In all cases the kind of which we find in the 
logical notions of identity, implications, disjunction or reciprocity. (Fakhry, 1983) 
The mind is not coerced to move by any imperative necessity from the affirmation 
of one to the affirmation of the other, nor from the denial of one to the denial of 
the other. The existence of one does not necessarily presuppose to the existence 
of the other. It is possible to suppose that fire is there and it does not burn, 
water is there and it does not quench thirst; there is no contradiction involved 
in such suppositions. The reason is not difficult to see. (De Boer, 1951 )Fire and 
burning or drinking and quenching of thirst are the phenomena of nature and 
nature per se, as per the philosophers' own admission, does not belong to the 
realm of necessity but to that of possibility such as may or may not exist. Any 
two events in nature considered cause and effect are merely possible existents 
and such; there can be no necessary connection between them. Thus, the 
causal relation is a natural that is possible, relation and not a logically necessary 
relation. Logical relations belong to the sphere of thought and not to that of 
nature. Now, we certainly do get a semblance of necessity subsisting in the 
relation of cause and effect because it occurred through our repeated 
conjunction of ideas of cause and effect in our mind. So whatever necessity 
there is in the causal relation, it is pseudo-necessity, for it is psychological 
necessity and not a logical one. (Corbin, 1993) Cause either co-exists with the 
effect or precedes it, but it is never the producer of it. No will an agency can be 
attributed to causes; in fact to none of the natural existents whether the celestial 
sphere or the planets and stars as well. Instead, the only will in the entire choir 
of heavens and furniture of earth is the omnipresent and omnipotent will of 
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God. It is only when He wills, and only through His willing it so, that the 
celestial spheres begin to swing in their orbits and the natural cause of events 
takes to a regular uniform causal pattern; fire burns light, water quenches thirst 
and so on so forth. Not even a more particle in the air, nor a leave on a tree, nor 
a fin of the fish in the depths of the sea moves but through the will of God. 
Would the philosophers realize it? (Sheikh, 1962) 
As regards to the latter, al-Ghazali (1963) states that the relation between 
cause and effect is not that of one to one as supposed by the philosophers 
which they did chiefly because of their pre-possession with plotinian 
emanationism and that in double sense. Cause certainly is not a unitary event 
but a composite one with an indefinite number of contributory factors. Some of 
which are positive and others negative, but the knowledge of both of which is 
necessary to understand the effective operation of a cause. Even an apparently 
simple phenomenon such as our seeing an object is a complex affair in as much 
as it depends upon our vision, light, absence of dust or smoke in the air, the 
distance and direction of the object from us, its size and color and shape, 
absence of an interposing object and so on. More important to note here, 
however, is that, an effect is not the result of one singular cause but of a 
plurality of causes. According to the view of the above analysis that of al-
Ghazali is one of the most original contributions to the history of Islamic thought 
and Human thought. (Sheikh, 1962) Nevertheless, it calls our intention to a 
number of important facts. Causes and effects belong to the realm of nature 
which is the realm of possibility, not that of necessity nor of cause of 
impossibility. The relation between cause and effect is not the relation of logical 
implication, so that by negating the one we must negate the other. Causes by 
themselves being inert entities cannot produce the effect through an agency 
and will of their own but only through the will of God which indeed is the only 
will operating in the entire universe. Causes are very complex phenomena; not 
only because of their composite character, but more especially because of their 
being a plurality of causes so that it is logically impossible to negate an effect 
merely on the negation of one particular cause except on the negation of all the 
various, in fact all the possible causes. The latter possibility is also really 
impossibility so far as we humans are concerned. According to al-Ghazali, the 
will of God being unconstrained by any external will or law unless the self 
imposed law of contradiction, can bring about all kinds of logical possibilities, 
even more wonderful and mysterious then the bodily resurrection in the hereafter. 
Nothing is impossible for God except the logically impossible. 
Al-Ghazali's Refutation on Causality Problem 
As we have already known al-Ghazali was the first theologian to undertake a 
systematic refutation of the concept of a necessary causal nexus. According to 
Fakhry (1983) in his book, his discussion of causality opens with the statement 
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that the correlation between the so called cause and effect is not necessary. It 
is plain however, that between two distinct conditions or events such as eating 
and satiety, contact with fire and burning, decapitation and dying, no such 
correlation can be asserted. The observed correlation between concomitant 
events in medicine, astronomy and the arts is due merely to God's action in 
joining them constantly. It is logically possible, however for this conjunction to 
be infringed and the so called effects be produced "ab initio" without their 
concomitant causes as indeed happens in what Muslims universally regard as 
miracles (mukjizat). For example, as he states that, take the case of life and 
growth in relation to animal. (Fakhry, 1983) It is plain that life as well as the 
cognitive and motive faculties which inhere in the sperm of animal are not the 
effects of the four primary qualities. Nor is the father, who deposits the sperm in 
the mother's womb, the cause of the infant's life, hearing, seeing etc. This cause 
in fact is the first Being. In fact, the prominent philosophers admit that the 
accidents which result from the conjunction of natural causes and effects are 
ultimately due to the "Giver of forms" (Wahib al-Surah) who is an angel from 
whom the substantial forms of natural objects manage, once matter has become 
sufficiently disposed to receive them. However, the philosophers might admit 
that the ultimate causes of natural processes super mundane. Accordingly, if 
we posit that fire is of a certain nature and cotton is of a certain nature also, it is 
impossible that fire should sometimes burn cotton and sometimes not, unless 
the nature of fire or that of cotton has changed in the interval. (Fakhry, 1983) In 
this connection, al-Ghazali's solution of this difficulty is that, the super mundane 
principles or agents particularly God do not act by way of causal necessity as 
the philosophers claim but rather by way of will. Consequently, it is quite 
possible logically for God to cause burning in some instances but not in others. 
Suppose that, everything becomes possible and nothing will be known 
with certainty except where God wishes at the same time to impart directly the 
knowledge corresponding to the action. For instance, we may imagine a man 
looking out on a strange score; fire burning, lion roaring, soldiers marching, 
without holding any part of it, because God did not create in him the 
corresponding perception of this scene at the time or we may leave a book 
behind and on returning home find that the book has changed into lad or a 
beast out the lad has turned into a dog etc. (Fakhry, 1983) God could thus create 
whatever He pleases, in any order He pleases since He is not bound by any 
order causal or other. In his retort, al-Ghazali states that these absurdities would 
result only if we assume that God will not create in us the knowledge 
corresponding to the events or to the facts that they are possible. But God has 
created in us the knowledge that these events are merely possible not that they 
are actual. They could just as well occur as not occur. But it is also possible for 
a prophet or an ordinary man with prophetic to foresee (kasyaf) that such 
events will happen with a manner which does not conform with the normal 
cause of events in nature. (al-Ghazali, 1957) Without denying that certain 
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elements, for example, fire is endowed with certain properties such as the power 
to burn cotton, nevertheless, it is not logically excluded that God or His angels 
may cause this power to be checked in such a way that will not cause burning 
in the cotton, or He may create in the cotton the power to resist the action of 
burning. Such miracles reported in the Quran as Christ's resurrecting the dead 
or Musa's turning a stick into a serpent could thus be explained in a perfectly 
rational manner. Or it may be possible for God to effect His miraculous designs 
without violence to the natural process of events but rather through what 
might be called telescoping or abridging this process. Thus, such a matter, 
according to the peripatetic philosophers, is susceptible of many contrary 
qualities. To sum up, this account of al-Ghazali's causality is that, the most 
extraordinary occurrences in the world become possible and extraordinary events 
or miracles perfectly intelligible. (al-Ghazali, 1957) 
Al-Ghazali and Asha'rites Theologians 
Now again, as we know the conflict come to a head some half a century after Ibn 
Sina's death with the Tahafut al-Falasifah and other related works of the 
Asha'rite theologian al-Ghazali (d.505/1 111). Al-Ghazali is particularly noted for 
articulating the epistemological argument that necessary causal connection in 
nature cannot be established empirically. Observation only shows concomitance 
(Ishtirak) not necessary causal coection. But this argument did not originate 
with al-Ghazali. It has a background in early kalam and we find its essential in 
the writing of the Asha'rites, al-Baqillani (d.404/1013) some twenty five years 
before Ibn Sina's death. In this conection, we encountered the criticisms of 
necessary causation in al-Baqillani, the first has all elements of al-Ghazali's 
empirical critique. Al-Baqillani writes: (Marmura, 1982) 
"Regarding the thing about which they have so much, namely that they 
know through sense perception and necessarily (Hissan wa Ittiraran) 
that the occurrences of burning and of becoming intoxicated are due to 
the heat of the fire and to excessive drinking, this is monumental ignorance. 
This is because we observe and perceive with the senses only the change 
of state of the body when drink is consumed and fire approach and its 
present state of being intoxicated, burn and changed from its previous 
nothing more. Knowledge of the agent of this new occurring state, however 
does not come about by experiencing such an agent, but is something 
apprehended through subtle examination and probing. Thus some say 
that, it is the act of eternal being, a creator out of nothing, powerful and 
this is the truth weuphold. Others say it is the act of the human who came 
close to the fire and who took the drink, that it is generated by his action 
which is the cause of the body's burning and intoxication. Some say that 
it is the act of the nature in the body, albeit I do not know whether this is 
74 
The Problem of Causality in Islamic Thought: A Viewpoint of Al-Ghazali 
the very body imprinted with the nature or some other notion in it. Then 
they are those who say that the nature is an accident. " 
It is in connection with this criticism that the author shall now consider Ibn 
Sina's second argument to establish his causal principle. He was also responding 
to this type of Ash'arite criticisms. On the other hand, he repeatedly 
acknowledged that the observation of regularities in nature by itself shows 
only concomitance, not necessary causal connection. To some extend, he is in 
total agreement with the Asha'arites empirical position. Further the second 
argument al-Baqillani uses is directed against the theory that the efficient cause 
is a nature that necessitates its effect and co-exists with it. More specifically it 
is an objection to those naturalist thinkers (al-Falasifah al-Tabi'iyyun) discussed 
in kalam literature who maintains that the world is the necessary product of the 
four eternal natures and hence is eternal. He argues: (Marmura, 1982) 
"If the nature is pre-eternal and post- eternal and the thing regenerated 
by it is likewise pre-eternal and posteternal, then why is it more proper 
one the two to necessitate and cause the other than it is for the supposed 
effect to be the cause (sababun) and ground (illatun)" 
As already known the Asha'rites atomize matter, space and time as a result 
of which the universe becomes a domains of separate, concrete entities which 
are independent of each other. Therefore, there is no connection between one 
moment of their existence and the next. Accordingly, the Asha'rites deny that 
there is any horizontal nexus between things. In other words, they deny the 
Aristotelian notion of causality. As we have already understood, the Asha'rite 
idea of God as the sole cause of all things and of all events negates the role of 
secondary causes in nature. No finite, created being can be the cause of 
anything. It is not in the nature of things to possess a causal power or quality. 
The so-called power which natural objects including human beings seems to 
possess is not an effective power, for it is derived power. (Corbin, 1993; Marmura, 
1982) 
Al-Ghazali's Proof on Second Causal Theory 
Now we come back to al-Ghazali's second causal theory in the 17th Discussion 
of his Tahafut al-Falasifah (Marmura, 1981) In early discussion al-Ghazali makes 
it quite clear that his denying necessary causal connection is directly concerned 
with the two different versions. One is the version that attributes necessary 
causal action to observable things. The second version however confines 
such action to the celestial principles. These principles act by necessity, their 
action being further conditioned by the receptive potentialities of the things 
they act on. Accordingly, a miracle whereby a prophet placed in a fiery furnace 
survives unscathed is impossible. Al-Ghazali rejecting this second version also 
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argues for the possibility of such a miracle in two ways. He first of all, reaffirms 
the Asha'rite position that all events are the voluntary creation of God, poses 
an objection to this doctrine then vigorously answer the objection. Secondly, 
he suggests and develops an alternative causal theory. This second theory 
however, introduces in part and with certain modifications a view of natural 
causation which al-Ghazali had earlier rejected. In approaching the 17th 
Discussion two things particularly must be kept in mind. (Marmura, 1981) The 
first is that, in the first part of the Tahafut there is persistent criticism of the 
concept of causal necessitation mainly as applied to God. Again and again al-
Ghazali attacks and rejects the doctrine that God's act proceed by necessity 
from His very essence or nature. The divine act, he insists is voluntary. By 
doing so, he argues in effect the eternal attributes of life, will, power and 
knowledge must be additional to the divine essence, not identical with it. Al-
Ghazali's position in all this is characteristically Asha'rite. Furthermore, he 
argues in the 3rd Discussion declaring that what is inanimate has no action. In 
the same Discussion he also gives his example of the finger's movement in 
water to illustrate the Asha'rite occasion list doctrine that explains all change 
as a series of creations after non-existence enacted voluntarily and directly by 
God. The second thing is that to show that certain miracles deemed impossible 
by the Muslim philosophers are in fact possible. (al-Ghazali, 1957) In the preface 
of the second part of the Tahafut, al-Ghazali discusses two types of miracles, 
one type rejected as impossible by the philosophers, the second is accepted by 
them. The type they reject consists of miracles that contradict their theory of a 
world order of causally necessitated events. They thus deny al-Ghazali telling 
us the literal truth of Quranic accounts of such miracles as the changing of 
Musa staff into a serpent and the raising of the dead, interpreting this accounts 
metaphorically. However, in reality, al-Ghazali does not deny the possibility of 
accounting for the type of miracle stating that this is among the things that may 
belong to prophets. Nevertheless, the miracle to divine action is not to the 
power of the prophet. (al-Juwayni, 1950). There are some who think the 
philosophers' perspective on causality has been dealt a serious blow by al-
Ghazali's well-known counter example of the fire. In denying fire its nature as a 
burning agent, al-Ghazali was no doubt influenced by the story of the miracle of 
prophet Ibrahim mentioned in the Quran. Ibrahim was thrown into the fire by his 
polytheist enemies, but was not burnt. We were once personally reminded by 
Schuon that the same Quranic verse can be used as an argument against the 
theologians in favour of the philosophers. The verses in question read as 
follow: 
"They said, "Burn him and protect your Gods if ye do (anything at all)!" 
We said, "0 Fire! Be thou cool, and safety for Abraham!" 
(al-Anbiya 21: 68-69) 
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Schuon answers on behalf of the philosophers that if indeed fire is not a 
burning agent, then God would not have commanded the fire to cool!. (Bakar, 
1991). 
Al-Ghazali and His Work Al-lqtisad Fi'l Iqtiqad 
Finally we reach to the end of the discussion by clarifying al-Ghazali's view on 
this matter in his other book namely al-Iqtisadfi'l Ftiqad (al-Ghazali: 1962) 
which confirms that he upholds the Asha'rite causal doctrine. Properly speaking, 
we do not find in the Iqtisad any mention of the second causal theory. But what 
we are discovering is that, al-Ghazali concentrates on rejecting the Mu'tazilite 
doctrine of generated acts (al-Tawallud) which he identifies with the 
necessitation causal of theory of the philosophers. Yet, we also find in that 
book, another theological motive for his denial of causal action. That has to do 
with the doctrine of al-ajal (Watt, 1973). The Muslim theologians debated the 
question of whether, for example, a man when decapitated dies by the action of 
the sword or because of his ajal. Further he argues, that death is caused by God 
at the predestined time. The action of the hand lowering the sword he explains 
represents a series of events, of accidents (aradh) accompanied by another 
series of accidents, the separation of parts in the victim's neck. Death another 
concomitant event occurring at a certain juncture, however, is created by God. 
In his Discussion of this problem, al-Ghazali's declares the Asha'rite explanation 
to be the true one. (Marmura, 1981) He points out that the philosophers 
themselves in certain instances for example, when explaining the birth of the 
fetus hold similar views. They thus maintain that the new life occurs by it, the 
agent being God acting directly or through angelic mediation. To show how 
easy it is to mistake a containment event for the real case he then gives the 
hypothetical example. With this, he concludes the claim of those maintaining 
that fire is the agent of the burning, bread the agent of satiation, medication is 
the agent of health and so on is false. 
Philosophers' View on Causality 
In this section the author shall start with the Muslim Aristotelian philosophers 
such as al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd. For the first three 
philosophers the author shall discuss in short about the idea of causality and 
the last one will explain and elaborate in specific as counter part to al-Ghazali as 
have been already discussed. 
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Al-Kindi and His View 
Al-Kindi was rightly called "the philosopher of the Arabs" (Shariff, 1960) In 
this connection, his arguments for the existence of God depends on the belief in 
causality. For him, everything that comes to be must have a cause for its existence. 
The series of causes are finite and consequently there is a prime cause which is 
God. Causes enumerated by Aristotle are the material, the formal, the efficient 
and the final. In al-Kindi's philosophy, God is the Efficient Cause. There are two 
kinds of efficient causes; the first is the true efficient cause and its action is 
created from nothing. The second is all the other efficient causes are intermediate 
that is they are produced by other causes and are themselves the causes of 
other effect. They are so called by analogy (al-Qiyas or Tamthil). In fact, only 
God is the true Efficient Cause. He acts and is never acted upon. (al-Kindi, 1950) 
Al-Farabi and His View 
The philosopher after him was al-Farabi. He also followed al-Kindi in this 
matter who had applied the efficient cause as the first cause in the metaphysical 
things. He discussed the cosmological doctrine namely the theory of the ten 
intelligence (al-Uqul al-'Asyarah).From the ten intelligence he flows the prime 
matter or hyle which is the origin of the four elements forms which unite with 
the hyle to produce bodies. Generation (al-Kawn) is the result of the unity of 
form and matter and corruption (al-Fasad) is the result of this separation. All of 
these show us how al-Farabi discussed the four causes and as a result he made 
the efficient cause as the first cause which is no cause upon it. (al-Farabi, 1957) 
Al-Farabi does not deny the law of causality and the connection between 
causes and effects. Four causes may be either direct or indirect; and if it is an 
easy matter to discover the former, the latter is more difficult to detect. Hence it 
happens by chance or coincidence (Sudfah) and there is no way of controlling 
coincident. (Shariff, 1960) 
Ibn Sina and His View 
As for Ibn Sina like the two well-known philosophers before him, he has also 
followed them with the idea of the four causes. He divided the causes into four 
in his al-Syifa': al- Ilahiyyat (Ibn Sina: 1955) and his various treatises. The 
material cause for him is the substance of which a thing is made, the formal 
cause is the form or shape given to a thing while producing it, the efficient 
cause is the labour of an active agent that produces a thing and the final cause 
is the purpose for which a thing is product such as a knife. It can be defined as 
an iron implement (material cause) of such a form (formal cause) made by the 
ironsmith (efficient cause) for cutting things (final cause). He also differentiates 
the efficient cause into two stages. The first is natural and the other one is 
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theological. Hence, Allah S.W.T. in the term of Ibn Sina is the second stage who 
is the principle of all principles and the existence of all existences. 
Now we arrive at the last discussion on causality by taking Ibn Rushd as a 
philosopher' representative to counter al-Ghazali's view. In his Tahafut al-
Tahafut, Ibn Rushd (1978) says: 
"They deny the existence of efficient cause which is observed in sensible 
things is sophistry; for he who denies this can no longer acknowledge 
that every act must have an agent. The question whether these causes by 
themselves are sufficient to perform the acts which proceed from them or 
need an external cause for the perfection of their act whether separate or 
not, is not self evident and requires much investigations and research. 
And if the theologians had doubt about the efficient causes which are 
perceived to cause each other because there are also effects whose cause 
is not perceived as illogical. Those things which causes are not perceived 
are still unknown and must be investigated precisely because their causes 
are not perceived." 
In this regard, we can also see Abduh's argument like his saying "It is 
impossible for the people of Islam to deny the relation existing in this world 
between causes and effects." (Shariff, 1960) 
Consequently, Ibn Rushd argued that scientific knowledge believes in 
causality. To be scientific is to be able to predict what will happen in the future 
when a cause is given. Modern science not merely believes in causality in its 
older form but in causal lines and structures. Moreover he believed that 
everything in the world happens according to a perfect regularity which can be 
understood in terms of cause and effect. With this regard, Ibn Rushd brings us 
the notion of the physical world as he conceived by two principles. The one is 
the permanence of things and the other is the law of causality. For al-Ghazali, he 
denies the two principles (Shariff, 1960).Ibn Rushd explained these two principles 
from the philosophical point of view. The permanence of things, its definition 
and giving it a name. If a thing had not its specific nature, it would not have a 
special name nor a definition and all things would be one. Concerning the 
second principle he said that all events have four causes, agents, forms, matters 
and ends. Human mind perceives the things and their causes and he who 
denies causes, denies the intellect. (Ibn Rushd, 1964) Logic implies the existence 
of causes and effects and knowledge of the effects can only be rendered perfect 
through knowledge of their causes. As a result, Ibn Rushd denial of causes 
implies the denial of knowledge. In addition to this regard if the theologians 
defend its relationship is just a custom. Ibn Rushd asking what they mean by 
custom? If they mean the custom is the custom of the agent or the custom of the 
existing things, for him, he could not accept their explanation of this matter. It is 
because of the impossibility of God that should have a custom. The custom of 
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existing things is really their nature, since custom can only exist in the animated. 
(Ibn Rushd, 1957 trans. 1978) 
Concluding Remarks 
Thus, the foregoing discussion clearly shows that both positions are grounded 
on solid religious and rational foundations. As far as we are concerned, both 
figures were great thinkers and philosophers. Both were honest, sincere and 
devout Muslims. Both in their own ways made significant contribution to the 
past glory of Islam. More important still, both views on causality can be defended 
by the appealing to the Quran. We can always find the two schools of thoughts 
here namely the school of al-Ghazali or the theological and the second one is 
the school of Ibn Rushd or the scientific existing side by side and interacting 
with each other, sometimes positively and other times negatively depending on 
the level of their intellectual tolerance. Therefore, the theological perspective 
on causality seeks to explain the world and all phenomena, the natural and 
supernatural or the miraculous in terms of the divine omnipotence alone. In 
order to safeguard divine omnipotence it denies the objective reality of causal 
powers in creatures, given to them by God as part of their respective natures. 
With regard to the laws of nature, Asha'rites believe that they are not objectively 
real but they are mental constructs determined by the will of God and given the 
status of law by Him. Whereas the scientific perspective on causality seeks to 
explain the world and all phenomena including the miraculous. In terms of 
natural causes, the Muslim philosophers like al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and also Ibn 
Rushd never denied the reality of God as the Ultimate Cause of all things. But as 
men of science, they emphasized the importance of immediate and secondary 
causes without, however forgetting their divine origin. In order to safeguard 
this aspect of divine reality they emphasized the objective reality of the essences 
(zat) and attributes (sifat) of created things. Creation they maintained is the 
giving of being by God and the shining of the rays of intelligence. Finally, from 
the author point of view is that, this controversy or polemic among the Muslim 
theologians and the Muslim philosophers could be regarded as the 
methodological difference but not the purpose. For example, the philosophers 
have said that it must have mediations in occurring such a creation whereas the 
theologians deny such an operation. They said that the form of man is possible 
(Mumkin) by occupying in the soil without the mediations. Nevertheless, we 
can see in Tahqfut al-Falasifah al-Ghazali can adopt the idea of mediations and 
that means he is not against indirect creation. If this is so, the philosophers did 
not deviate completely from the validity of logic. Last but not least in this 
connection, the author need to say that al-Ghazali had his own approach and 
Ibn Rushd had also his own way or system in overcoming this problem. What 
is important for us now both of them have referred to Allah S.W.T. as the First 
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Creator, the First Cause, the Absolute Cause in creating all things. Yet, the 
author need to emphasize here that al-Ghazali did not deny absolutely the 
question of causality rather he has attempted to put this problem upon new 
basis namely the concrete philosophical foundation of certainty to one side 
and also tried to defend and refute an accusation of his denial of sciences and 
believed the sophist's view (al-Sufustoiyyah) on the other side. 
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